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Abstract 
When there is a large number of pre-fiscal income equals in the sample, the redistributive effects based on 
the Gini index may be inappropriately estimated. Due to its roots in the Gini framework, the problem also 
appears in the application of the Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) (DJA) decomposition of redistributive 
effects into vertical, classical horizontal inequity and reranking effects. This paper explains how the DJA 
implementation procedure must be adapted to produce correct estimates of different effects. The 
procedure is first illustrated on the 12-units hypothetical population and then applied to real data for the 
Croatian fiscal subsystem comprised of social security contributions, personal income tax, public 
pensions and cash social benefits. 
Keywords: redistributive effect, vertical equity, horizontal equity, pre-fiscal equals 
JEL: D63, H22, H23 
1. Introduction 
Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) (DJA) have designed a comprehensive model for the 
measurement of redistributive effect (RE).
1
 The DJA model decomposes RE into vertical, 
classical horizontal inequity (CHI) and reranking effects. It is built into the framework of the 
Atkinson-Gini social welfare functions, which makes it different from its older competitor, the 
widely acknowledged Aronson, Johnson and Lambert’s (1994) (AJL) decomposition of RE, 
which is set up in the Gini environment. The Atkinson-Gini social welfare function first converts 
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 RE is a change in inequality occurring in a transition from pre-fiscal to post-fiscal income. Generally, a pre-fiscal 
(post-fiscal) income is the income before (after) taxes and benefits. 
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incomes into utilities employing the Atkinson (1970) utility function, and then aggregates them 
using rank-dependent weights, which underlie the extended Gini coefficients proposed by 
Yitzhaki (1979). 
Despite its great measurement potential, the DJA model has not yet become widely 
employed by practitioners.2 Among the reasons for such condition are implementation 
difficulties. The model asks for the estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes (EPI) at different 
points of the pre-fiscal income distribution (PRFID), which requires certain statistical expertise 
related to data smoothing and curve fitting methods. Urban (2010) explains why inaccurate 
estimates of EPI lead to misleading values of indicators in the DJA model. A simple test is 
suggested to check the appropriateness of EPI estimates. Specifically, for certain combinations of 
two ethical parameters of the Atkinson-Gini framework, the CHI effect should collapse to zero; 
if this is not the case, the practitioner should re-evaluate the EPI curve.  
This paper reveals another challenge for practitioners applying the DJA model: if there is 
a large number of pre-fiscal income equals in the sample, common procedures for index 
computation will lead to flawed results. 
Researchers in the field of income redistribution know that exact pre-fiscal income equals 
are rare in the data samples. Still, there is one important exception: in the analysis of tax-and-
benefit systems, it may occur that many income units receive only income from government in 
the form of benefits, which implies that their pre-fiscal income is zero. Such an example came 
into sight in the study of Croatian individual taxes and cash social benefits, when one of the 
scenarios treated public pensions as social benefits. The consequence was that more than one 
tenth of all income units in the sample had zero pre-fiscal income. 
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 Bilger (2008) is the only published research using the DJA model. 
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A presence of a large number of pre-fiscal equals concentrated in one point of the PRFID 
can affect the estimates of various redistributive effects unless the appropriate adaptations are 
made. Urban (2010) explains how the post-fiscal income vector and pre-fiscal income quantiles 
must be adjusted to enable the correct estimation of the concentration coefficient of post-fiscal 
income. Otherwise, both the vertical and horizontal inequity terms in the Kakwani’s (1984) 
(K84) decomposition of RE, also set in the Gini environment, would be underestimated. 
Since K84 and DJA share the same Gini environment, in which incomes (utilities) are 
aggregated using rank-dependent weights, the problem of correct estimation in the presence of 
pre-fiscal equals also emerges in the DJA model. In the latter model, a failure to make 
adaptations can lead to a wrong assessment of the relative importance of CHI versus reranking. 
Furthermore, it can mistakenly convince the analyst that the estimate of EPI is inaccurate. 
This paper carefully explains the data manipulation and calculation procedures needed to 
obtain the indices of the DJA model in the case when there is a large number of (zero or non-
zero) pre-fiscal equals is in the sample. However, it can be useful to all practitioners employing 
standard methodologies in the field of income redistribution. Together with Urban (2010), it can 
serve as a ‘manual’ for practitioners applying the DJA methodology together with the original 
DJA’s work. 
Another peculiarity has been observed during the study of the Croatian fiscal system. 
Specifically, the estimated EPI curve is not increasing in a pre-fiscal income across the whole 
distribution of pre-fiscal incomes. This implies that the counterfactual fiscal system defined by 
EPI does not fully eliminate HI; a certain amount is left in the form of reranking. The 
implications are also discussed below. 
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Section 2 describes the procedures of data preparation and the calculation of various 
elements of the DJA model (counterfactual incomes, utilities, weights, welfare and inequality 
indices), ending with a short exposition of the DJA model. Section 3 applies the procedures to 
two different examples: a hypothetical one with a population of 12 units, and the other one, using 
real data on the Croatian system of personal taxes and social benefits in 2008. Different 
components obtained for real data are further analyzed and interpreted. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Calculation of indices 
2.1. Basic data preparation 
A typical research uses the following data for a household or family k : (a) unequivalized pre- 
and post-fiscal incomes, 
kX
ɺ  and 
kN
ɺ , (b) survey frequency weights 
kf , and (c) equivalence 
factors 
kβ .
3 Equivalized (henceforth, equivalized is omitted) pre- and post-fiscal incomes are 
kkk XX β/ɺ=  and kkk NN β/ɺ= , and frequency weights are kkk f βφ = . In the following analysis, 
we consider that household k  has kβ  ‘equivalent’ members instead of some number ku  of 
‘real’ individuals; thus, each equivalized income pair ),( kk NX  will be counted kφ  and not kkuf  
times. 
The matrix { }kkkk NXM φ,,0 =  is sorted lexicographically, first, in increasing order of pre-
fiscal income and then, within each group of pre-fiscal equals, in increasing order of post-fiscal 
income. Thus, we obtain the matrix { }xixixixi NXM φ,,= . Sorting 0kM  in increasing order of post-
fiscal income, { }nininini NXM φ,,=  is obtained. For the implementation of the DJA model we 
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 For an explanation of these items, see the concrete example of Croatian data in Section 3.2. 
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extract from xkM  and 
n
kM  the income vectors 
x
iX , 
x
iN , 
n
iN , and the frequency weights 
x
iφ  and 
n
iφ .  
Another vector is needed for the DJA model, the one that contains the estimates of EPI 
for each value of pre-fiscal income xiX . We denote this counterfactual post-fiscal income vector 
as E
iN . To obtain it, we must smooth a dataset (
x
iX ,
x
iN ), i.e. approximate the mean response 
curve Em  in the regression relationship i
x
i
x
i XmN δ+= )( . The basic form of the curve m  is 
chosen by the analyst from a great variety of possible choices, such as OLS polynomial 
regressions, kernel regressions, local polynomial regressions, Gini regressions, Fourier 
transformations, etc. Let )(ˆ xi
E Xm  be the correct approximation of Em ; then, )(ˆ xi
EE
i XmN = . 
2.2. Utilities 
Incomes are converted into utilities according to the Atkinson (1970) utility function with the 
inequality aversion parameter ε . When 1≠ε , utilities of incomes ziY  are:
4
 
 
1( )
( , )
1
z
z i
i
Y
U Y
ε
ε
ε
−
=
−
 (1) 
Analogously to (1), utilities ),( εxiXU , ),( ε
x
iNU , ),( ε
E
iNU  and ),( ε
n
iNU  are obtained.  
Now, for each value ε  we can estimate the regression relationship 
i
x
i
Px
i XmNU δε += )(),(  to obtain the approximation )(ˆ
x
i
P
Xm  and another vector of fitted 
values )(ˆ,
x
i
PP
i XmU =ε . It shows the expected post-fiscal utilities at different points of the 
PRFID. 
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 We omit the specific formula that must be used when 1=ε  to keep the exposition more simple. 
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If EiN  is properly estimated, we should have that: 
 
s s sx E x x n n
i i i i i ii i i
N N Nπ ϕ π ϕ π ϕ= =∑ ∑ ∑  (2) 
where 1)( −= Sπ . Equation (2) indicates that the means of all post-fiscal income vectors are 
equal. Similarly, the following average utilities of post-fiscal incomes are also equal if PiU ε,  is 
properly estimated: 
 
, ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
s s s sx P x E x x n n
i i i i i i i ii i i i
U U N U N U Nεπ ϕ π ϕ ε π ϕ ε π ϕ ε= = =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (3) 
2.3. Quantile estimates 
We turn to the estimation of the quantiles of PRFID, xipˆ , and the weights needed for the 
computation of welfare indices, νϖ ,ˆ xi . They can be obtained in the following way: 
 1
11
ˆ (2 ) ( )
ix x x
i j jj
p S ϕ ϕ− −== +∑  (4) 
 , 1 1ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )x xi iS p
ν νϖ ν− −= −  (5) 
where 00 =
xφ , ∑ ==
s
j
x
jS 1φ , s  is the number of sample units and ν  is an ethical parameter 
determining the weights of the Gini social welfare function. Analogously, nkpˆ  and 
νϖ ,ˆ nk  are 
obtained. 
Alternatively, when 1=xiφ  for all i , we can rather use the following formula for the 
weights νϖ ,ˆ xi : 
 ,ˆ [( 1) ( ) ]xi s s i s i
ν ν ν νϖ −= − + − −  (6) 
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Now, assume that 0=xiX  for qi ,,1…= ; these are our q  exact equals with zero pre-fiscal 
income. Observe that the weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  are strictly decreasing in 
x
ipˆ ; it means that 
νν ϖϖ ,,1 ˆ...ˆ
x
q
x >> , i.e. pre-fiscal equals obtain different weights. However, this contradicts the very 
notion of the indices based on rank-dependent weights: if there are units with the same pre-fiscal 
income, they belong to the same quantile, and equal weights should be ascribed to them. 
Therefore, we must obtain a new set of weights, νϖ ,xi
⌢
: 
 
1 ,
, 1 1
,
ˆ( )                for 1, ,
ˆ                                                 for 
q qx x x
j c cx j c
i
x
i
i q
i q
ν
ν
ν
ϕ ϕ ϖ
ϖ
ϖ
−
= =
 ⋅ =
= 
>
∑ ∑ …⌢
 (7) 
Of course, the analogous procedure should be applied across the whole PRFID to account 
for all groups of pre-fiscal equals revealed by the inspection of xiX . 
2.4. “Welfare” indices 
The estimate of the Gini-Atkinson welfare index for incomes ziY  and weights 
νϖ ,ˆ xk  is the 
following: 
 , ,
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , )
sz z z z z
i j i j jj
W Y U Yν νε ν ϖ ε ϕ ϖ
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑  (8) 
Combining different utilities and sets of weights, we obtain the welfare index 
)ˆ;,,(ˆ ,νϖνε ni
n
iNW , and all other indices between which the following relationships exist: 
 , ,ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )x x x xi i i iW X W X
ν νε ν ϖ ε ν ϖ=
⌢ ⌢
 (9) 
 , ,ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )E x E xi i i iW N W N
ν νε ν ϖ ε ν ϖ=
⌢ ⌢
 (10) 
 , ,ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )x x x xi i i iW N W N
ν νε ν ϖ ε ν ϖ<
⌢ ⌢
 (11) 
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 , , ,, ,
ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )P x P x x xi i i i i iW U W U W N
ν ν ν
ε εε ν ϖ ε ν ϖ ε ν ϖ= =
⌢ ⌢⌢ ⌢
 (12) 
Identities (9), (10) and (12) tell us that for vectors xiX , 
E
iN  and 
P
iU ε,  it does not matter 
whether νϖ ,ˆ xi  or 
νϖ ,xi
⌢
 is used, simply because these vectors have equal values for qi ,1,…= .  
The situation is different for xiN ; its welfare index for 
νϖ ,ˆ xi  is lower than when 
νϖ ,xi
⌢
 are 
used. In fact, the whole procedure of weights adaptation is introduced in order to properly 
estimate the welfare index for xiN . Why does the index )ˆ;,,(
ˆ ,νϖνε xi
x
iNW  underestimate the true 
welfare? To answer this question, we have to recall the meaning of the weights in the model. 
They assign to each pre-fiscal quantile p  relative importance to the overall welfare of incomes 
situated at this quantile. If 0=xiX  for qi ,,1…= , then all these units’ incomes should receive 
equal importance, i.e. equal weight. For the weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  this is not the case, because units with 
i  closer to q  will gain lower weights than those closer to 1, and since incomes xiN  within each 
group of exact equals are sorted in ascending order, the result (11) follows.
5
 
Somewhat less obvious seems to be the identity (11), saying that PiU ε,  and 
x
iN  (if proper 
weights are used) result in equal welfare indices. Recall that PiU ε,  averages the utilities ),( ε
x
iNU  
at some pre-fiscal quantile p ; therefore, the sum of 
P
iU ε,  for all income units at p  should be 
equal to the sum of ),( εxiNU . 
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 A simple example can demonstrate this algebraic effect. Three incomes are 10, 20 and 40; their respective weights 
A are 3, 2 and 1, while the weights B are 2, 2 and 2 respectively. The sum-product of incomes and weights A 
(weights B) is 110 (120). 
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2.5. “Inequality” indices 
The inequality index )ˆ;,,(ˆ ,νϖνε zj
z
iYI  is calculated as follows: 
 
1
, , 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] /z z z z Yi j i jI Y W Y
ν ν εε ν ϖ ε ε ν ϖ µ−= − −  (13) 
where Yµˆ  is the mean of the income vector ziY . For convenience reasons, we will use the 
abbreviated version )(ˆ ziYI  or )(
z
iYI
⌢
, depending on whether the weights νϖ ,ˆ zj  or 
νϖ ,zj
⌢
 are used. 
Following (13), by using welfare )ˆ;,,(ˆ ,νϖνε xi
x
iXW  and the mean pre-fiscal income 
Xµˆ , we 
obtain inequality indices of pre-fiscal income )()(ˆ xi
x
i XIXI
⌢
= . Similarly, inequality indices 
)ˆ;(ˆ ,νϖ ni
n
iNI , )()(
ˆ E
i
E
i NINI
⌢
= , )()(ˆ ,,
P
i
P
i UIUI εε
⌢
= , )(ˆ xiNI  and )(
x
iNI
⌢
 are obtained by using 
corresponding welfare indices, weights and the mean post-fiscal income Nµˆ . 
The previous section discussed the identity of welfare indices calculated for xiN  and 
P
iU ε, . It follows that the corresponding welfare indices are also equal: )(
ˆ)( ,
P
i
x
i UINI ε=
⌢
. This 
property has a practical implication that we do not need to estimate PiU ε,  and )(
ˆ
,
P
iUI ε  at all; 
instead, we calculate )( xiNI
⌢
. 
2.6. DJA decomposition 
The difference )(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ ni
x
i NIXI −=∆ νε  is the basic measure of inequality change caused by a 
fiscal system – the redistributive effect. The DJA model decomposes RE into three terms, as 
shown by the following equation, which can be written in two ways, given that )(ˆ)( ,
P
i
x
i UINI ε=
⌢
: 
 
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ           [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
x E x E n x
i i i i i i
x E P E n P
i i i i i i
I X I N I N I N I N I N
I X I N I U I N I N I Uε ε
ε ν∆ = − − − − − =
= − − − − −
⌢ ⌢
 (14) 
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The three differences in brackets, )(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ Ei
x
i
DJA NIXIV −=νε , ),(ˆ νεDJAC −= )( xiNI
⌢
 
)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ ,
E
i
P
i
E
i NIUINI −=− ε  and )(ˆ)(ˆ)()(ˆ),(ˆ ,
P
i
n
i
x
i
n
i
DJA UINININIR ενε −=−=
⌢
, are the vertical, 
CHI and reranking effects of the DJA model. 
We can divide ),(ˆ νεDJAR  into two parts: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]DJA n x x xi i i iR I N I N I N I Nε ν = − + −
⌢
 (15) 
The difference )()(ˆ xi
x
i NINI
⌢
−  is positive and shows by how much the DJA reranking 
effect is underestimated if )(ˆ xiNI  is employed instead of )(
x
iNI
⌢
. At the same time, and by the 
same amount, the DJA CHI effect will be overestimated. The difference 
)()(ˆ),(ˆ
x
i
x
i
und
NINIR
⌢
−=νε  can be called the ‘underestimation of the reranking term’. Its 
magnitude will be revealed in the following hypothetical and real examples. The other 
difference, )(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ xi
n
i
res NINIR −=νε , can simply be referred to as the ‘residual of the reranking 
term’. 
3. Two examples 
3.1. Hypothetical data example 
The first example employs a hypothetical population of twelve income units. Table 1 presents 
most of the vectors needed for the computation of different indices. The first six units are pre-
fiscal exact equals with zero pre-fiscal income, while the remaining units have different pre-
fiscal incomes xiX . The two sets of weights are presented; first, the original ones, 
νϖ ,ˆ xi , obtained 
by using (6), which assume that all the units have different pre-fiscal incomes; the weights νϖ ,xi
⌢
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are the same as the original ones, except for the units #1 to #6, which are equal to 
6/ˆ
6
1
,, ∑ == c
x
c
x
i
νν ϖϖ⌢ , as the rule (7) demands. 
TABLE 1 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE (UTILITIES FOR 5.0=ε ; WEIGHTS FOR 2=ν ) 
# νϖ ,ˆ xi  
νϖ ,xi
⌢
 
x
iX  
x
iN  
n
iN  
E
iN  ),( ε
x
iXU
 
),( εxiNU
 
),( εniNU
 
),( εEiNU
 
P
iU ε,  
1 0.160 0.125 0 10 10 52 0.00 6.32 6.32 14.43 13.70 
2 0.146 0.125 0 20 20 52 0.00 8.94 8.94 14.43 13.70 
3 0.132 0.125 0 30 30 52 0.00 10.95 10.95 14.43 13.70 
4 0.118 0.125 0 50 50 52 0.00 14.14 14.14 14.43 13.70 
5 0.104 0.125 0 80 75 52 0.00 17.89 17.32 14.43 13.70 
6 0.090 0.125 0 110 80 52 0.00 20.98 17.89 14.43 13.70 
7 0.076 0.076 50 100 100 76 14.14 20.00 20.00 17.44 16.15 
8 0.063 0.063 100 75 110 100 20.00 17.32 20.98 20.00 18.61 
9 0.049 0.049 150 150 125 124 24.49 24.49 22.36 22.27 21.06 
10 0.035 0.035 200 125 150 148 28.28 22.36 24.49 24.32 23.52 
11 0.021 0.021 300 250 200 196 34.64 31.62 28.28 27.99 28.43 
12 0.007 0.007 400 200 250 244 40.00 28.28 31.62 31.22 33.34 
 1 1 1200 1200 1200 1200 161.56 223.31 223.31 229.85 223.31 
Post-fiscal incomes xiN  of the first six units are sorted in ascending order, following the 
procedure from Section 2.1. There is a large variation among incomes within this group of exact 
pre-fiscal equals. Furthermore, unit #6 has a larger post-fiscal income than units #7 and #8, 
which is the evidence of reranking; other instances of reranking are between units #5 and #8 (#7 
and #8; #9 and #10; #11 and #12). 
Table 1 presents different utility vectors obtained for 5.0=ε . Two specific vectors, EiN  
and PiU ε, , are estimated in the following way: they are calculated as 
x
i
EEE
i XbaN
⌢⌢
+=  and 
x
i
PPP
i XbaU
⌢⌢
+=ε, , where 
Ea
⌢
, Eb
⌢
, Pa
⌢
 and Pb
⌢
 are coefficients obtained by Gini regressions in 
12 
 
which xiX  was an independent variable, while 
x
iN  and )5.0,( =ε
x
iNU  were the respective 
dependent variables.
6
 
Figure 1a shows actual post-fiscal incomes xiN  and expected post-fiscal incomes 
E
iN , 
plotted against the pre-fiscal income xiX . Figure 1b presents the utilities of actual post-fiscal 
incomes )5.0,( =εxiNU  and their expected values 
P
iU ε, . 
FIGURE 1 
EXPECTED POST-FISCAL INCOMES AND UTILITIES 
(a)      (b) 
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Notes: Utilities are obtained for 5.0=ε ; Gini regressions are estimated for 2=ν . 
The inequality indices are calculated for four combinations of parameters ε  and ν , and 
presented in Table 2. The distinction between )(ˆ xiNI  and )(
x
iNI
⌢
 enables us to properly capture 
the reranking effect ),(ˆ νεDJAR . As (15) reveals, in the presence of pre-fiscal equals, the measure 
                                                   
6
 See Schechtman, Yitzhaki and Artsev (2008) for details about Gini regressions. The beta coefficient for the first 
regression is ),(/),( ,, νν ψψ xi
x
i
x
i
x
i
E XCOVNCOVb
⌢⌢⌢
= , where νψ ,xi
⌢
 is obtained as νϖψ νν /,, xi
x
i s
⌢⌢
= . The 
alpha coefficient is 
XENE ba µµ ˆˆ
⌢⌢
−= . 
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)(ˆ)(ˆ xi
n
i NINI −  would underestimate the true amount of reranking by ),(ˆ νε
und
R . In our 
hypothetical case, ),(ˆ νεundR  is quite high.  
When 0=ε  and 2=ν , we can see that 0),(ˆ =νεDJAC , which is the result inherent to the 
DJA model. However, what would happen if the CHI effect was calculated as )(ˆ)(ˆ Ei
x
i NINI −  
instead as )(ˆ)( Ei
x
i NINI −
⌢
? It would be positive and equal to ),(ˆ νεundR , while the reranking 
effect would be reduced to )(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ xi
n
i
res NINIR −=νε . 
TABLE 2 
INDICES OBTAINED FOR HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION 
 
0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
3=ν  
5.0=ε  
1=ν  
)(ˆ xiXI  0.666667 0.924304 0.984997 0.546834 
)(ˆ niNI  0.388889 0.479165 0.619086 0.134222 
)(ˆ xiNI  0.368056 0.465696 0.607441 0.134222 
)( xiNI
⌢
 0.319444 0.411984 0.500583 0.134222 
)(ˆ ,
P
iUI ε  0.319444 0.411984 0.500583 0.134222 
)(ˆ EiNI  0.319444 0.349193 0.437733 0.072948 
     
),(ˆ νε∆  0.277778 0.445139 0.365911 0.412612 
),(ˆ νεDJAV  0.347222 0.575111 0.547264 0.473886 
),(ˆ νεDJAC  0.000000 0.062791 0.062850 0.061274 
),(ˆ νεDJAR  0.069444 0.067181 0.118503 0.000000 
),(ˆ νεundR  0.048611 0.053711 0.106858 0.000000 
),(ˆ νεresR  0.020833 0.013469 0.011645 0.000000 
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3.2. Real data example: Croatian personal taxes and cash social benefits 
The fiscal subsystem to be analyzed here consists of three types of social security contributions 
(SSCs; for the pension, health and unemployment insurance), personal income tax and surtax 
(PITS), public pensions and six types of cash social benefits.
7
 
The data on incomes are taken from the Croatian household budget survey (APK). Since 
the APK only registers the net incomes of household members, it was a pre-requisite to build a 
microsimulation model in order to obtain the amounts of PITS and SSCs. The APK is available 
for years 2001 to 2008, and the samples contain around 3,000 households. The analysis here is 
based on the 2008 APK sample, consisting of 3,108 households. 
Pre- and post-fiscal incomes are obtained in the following way. Denote with kX
ɺ , kT
ɺ , kB
ɺ  
and kkkk BTXN
ɺɺɺɺ +−= , the pre-fiscal income, the sum of all taxes paid, the sum of all benefits 
received and the post-fiscal income of household k . The incomes are deflated by the 
equivalence factor obtained using the ‘modified OECD scale’, kkk ca 3.0)1(5.01 +−+=β , where 
ka  and kc  represent the numbers of adults and children in a household k. 
Income units are shown in Figure 2, where incomes are expressed in terms of the mean 
pre-fiscal income. Concentrate on the units to the left of the dotted vertical line; they can be 
divided into two groups, each covering about 11% of all units, or about 22% in total. In the first 
group, we have units with a zero pre-fiscal income; in the second group, pre-fiscal incomes are 
less than 1/10 of the mean pre-fiscal income. On the other hand, the average post-fiscal incomes 
                                                   
7
 Basic support allowances, unemployment benefit, child allowance, sick-leave benefit, maternity and layette 
supplement, and supplement for the injured and support for rehabilitation and employment of people with 
disabilities. 
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for these two groups are 62% and 52% of mean pre-fiscal income, respectively. Thus, for the 
lower fifth of population, the overwhelming part of income comes from social transfers, mainly 
public pensions. 
FIGURE 2 
SCATTERGRAM OF PRE- AND POST-FISCAL INCOMES 
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EPI vector EiN  is obtained using the Curve Fitting Toolbox 1.2 (henceforth: CFT), an 
interactive tool for graphical data exploration that works within Matlab R2007b. CFT enables the 
use of a dozen of pre-programmed parametric and non-parametric models and provides an 
opportunity to program one’s own model. The model employed in this research is the Fourier 
series – a sum of sine and cosine functions describing a periodic signal. The number of terms or 
harmonics chosen is 8 (a maximum allowed by the program), the algorithm used is the 
Levenberg-Marquardt, and robust fitting options are not used. The top twelve pre-fiscal income 
units are excluded from the fitting process and their values EiN  are set to be equal to 
x
iN . The 
identical procedure was used in estimating PiU ε, . 
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The advantage of this model is that it can provide us with a spoon-shaped curve, which 
describes well the specific feature of the current data, where EPI initially falls. The EPI starting 
point (i.e. when pre-fiscal income is zero) is approximately equal to the mean post-fiscal income 
for the group of zero pre-fiscal income exact equals. Two other desirable features of this 
particular method are: (a) the mean of EiN  is exactly equal to the mean of actual incomes 
x
iN ; 
(b) for 0=ε , ),(ˆ νεDJAC  is very close to zero: for 2.1=ν  it is equal to 0.02% of 
)2.1,0(ˆ ==∆ νε , for 3=ν  it is equal to 0.14% of )3,0(ˆ ==∆ νε . Thus, the estimate 
convincingly passes the test suggested by Urban (2010), which demands that 0),(ˆ ≈νεDJAC  for 
0=ε . 
The results of the DJA decomposition for the Croatian fiscal system are shown in Table 3. 
The underestimation of the reranking term, ),(ˆ νεundR , is relatively small in comparison to RE, 
but when compared to total HI, measured by ),(ˆ),(ˆ νενε DJADJA RC + , it is not negligible, ranging 
from 3.3% to 5.6% for different combinations of ε  and ν . The meaning of ),(ˆ νεundR  is 
explained in the following section. 
TABLE 3 
INDICES OBTAINED FOR THE REAL FISCAL SUBSYSTEM 
 
0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
3=ν  
5.0=ε  
1=ν  
)(ˆ xiXI  0.514079 0.702777 0.845047 0.284834 
)(ˆ niNI  0.299155 0.340488 0.448383 0.074615 
)(ˆ xiNI  0.254675 0.299256 0.374014 0.074615 
)(
x
iNI
⌢
 0.252521 0.296900 0.367694 0.074615 
)(ˆ ,
P
iUI ε  0.252653 0.297038 0.368091 0.074616 
)(ˆ EiNI  0.252653 0.269239 0.336353 0.053050 
     
),(ˆ νε∆  0.214924 0.362289 0.396663 0.210219 
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),(ˆ νεDJAV  0.261426 0.433538 0.508693 0.231783 
),(ˆ νεDJAC  -0.000132 0.027661 0.031341 0.021564 
),(ˆ νεDJAR  0.046634 0.043588 0.080689 0.000000 
),(ˆ νεundR  0.002153 0.002356 0.006320 0.000000 
),(ˆ νεresR  0.044480 0.041232 0.074369 0.000000 
     
)()(ˆ ,
x
i
P
i NIUI
⌢
−ε  -0.000132 -0.000138 -0.000396 -0.000002 
),(ˆ νεundR  (% ∆ˆ ) 1.00 0.65 1.59 0.00 
),(ˆ νεundR  (%HI) 4.6 3.3 5.6 0.00 
3.3. Reranking effect overestimated 
As we have seen, the vertical effect ),(ˆ νεDJAV  is not affected by the choice of weights. On the 
other hand, CHI and the reranking effect are, and if the non-adapted weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  are used in the 
presence of pre-fiscal equals, the former (the latter) effect will be overestimated (underestimated) 
by the amount of ),(ˆ νεundR . This irregularity will be obvious in a particular case when 0=ε ; 
here, the DJA CHI effect should be equal to zero by construction. However, if it is calculated as 
)(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ * Ei
x
i
DJA NINIC −=νε , it will be positive, which may be confusing to practitioners.8 
DJA (2003) examined the ratio between the CHI and reranking terms. It should indicate 
the relative importance of CHI versus reranking in the analysed fiscal system. The ratio of the 
incorrectly calculated CHI to the reranking indices, ),(ˆ/),(ˆ * νενε resDJA RC , will be higher than 
the ratio of the properly measured ones, ),(ˆ/),(ˆ νενε DJADJA RC . Figure 3 shows these ratios for 
different values of ν  and ε . They increase both with ε  and ν/1 . The ratio 
),(ˆ/),(ˆ * νενε resDJA RC  significantly overestimates ),(ˆ νεDJAC ),(ˆ/ νεDJAR , by up to 20 percentage 
points. 
                                                   
8
 If they apply the appropriateness test for the estimate of EPI vector suggested by Urban (2010), they may reject the 
current EPI estimate although it is the correct one. 
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FIGURE 3 
CHI/RERANKING RATIO 
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Abbreviations: “C” = ),(ˆ νεDJAC , “R1” = ),(ˆ νεundR , “R0” = ),(ˆ νεresR , “v” = ν  
3.4. Structure of the vertical effect 
Let us look at the structure of the vertical effect, presented in Figure 4, where all components are 
separately identified as shares in the total vertical effect. When 1=ν , there can be no reranking; 
CHI makes about 10% of the vertical effect. If 1=ν  and 0=ε , there is no inequality at all. 
When 1>ν  and 0=ε , there can be no CHI in the DJA model. For 1>ν  and 0>ε , the ratio 
between CHI and reranking increases with ε  and ν/1 , as we have already seen in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 4 
COMPOSITION OF VERTICAL EFFECT 
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(c) 2=ν       (d) 3=ν  
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Abbreviations: “C” = 
DJACˆ , “R1” = undRˆ , “R0” = resRˆ , “RE” = ∆ˆ  
3.5. Reranking effect of the counterfactual system 
The vertical effect symbolizes the potential RE, the one that would be achieved in the absence of 
HI. Although the authors conceptualizing the decompositions of RE refrain from suggesting 
policy makers to eliminate HI, this notion is implicit in the K84, AJL and DJA models. Thus, we 
can say with certainty that the EPI curve EiN  of the DJA model eliminates CHI. What about the 
other manifestation of HI – reranking? Eradication of CHI will nullify reranking, but there are 
some exceptions. One of them is present in our empirical case. Notice again the shape of EPI 
curve in Figure 2: it is decreasing on the interval [0,0.1]. It means that some units in this interval 
have higher expected post-fiscal incomes than some units outside this interval. The 
counterfactual system (CS) defined by EPI eradicates CHI, but it is not reranking-free. 
Therefore, a certain amount of HI is implied in the form of reranking. 
Let us illustrate this on the current example. We can compute the DJA model indicators 
for the CS as follows. Pre-fiscal incomes and frequency weights are equal to the original ones;  
x
i
CSx
i XX =
,  and xi
CSx
i φφ =
, . Post-fiscal incomes xiN  are replaced by expected post-fiscal incomes 
E
iN  of the actual system; hence 
E
i
CSx
i NN =
, . The expected post-fiscal incomes of CS are equal 
to the expected post-fiscal incomes E
iN  of the actual system; 
CSx
i
E
i
CSE
i NNN
,, == . Finally, post-
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fiscal incomes and frequency weights are sorted together in increasing order to obtain CSniN
,  and 
CSn
i
,φ . 
We know in advance that the CHI effect of CS is zero for all ε , because CSxi
CSE
i NN
,, = . 
The vertical effect is equal to the one achieved by the actual system because xi
CSx
i XX =
,  and 
E
i
CSE
i NN =
, . If the vertical effect of the actual system really represents the potential RE, the RE 
of CS should be equal to ),(ˆ νεDJAV , the vertical effect of the actual system. However, in an 
example like ours, this will not be the case. Specifically, we will have that )(ˆ)(ˆ ,, CSEi
CSn
i NINI > ; 
therefore the reranking effect of CS will be greater than zero, 0)(ˆ)(ˆ ,, >− CSEi
CSn
i NINI , and RE of 
CS will be )(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ ,,,, CSEi
CSx
i
DJACSCSn
i
CSx
i NIXIVNIXI −=<∆=− νενε . 
Figure 5 shows different effects that ‘constitute’ the vertical effect, all of them expressed 
as shares in the pre-fiscal income inequality. The largest component is RE, ∆ˆ ; next, we have the 
HI of the actual system reduced by the reranking of CS, CSDJADJADJA RRH ,ˆˆˆ −+ ; in the end, there 
is the reranking of CS itself, CSDJAR ,ˆ . The three components together make the vertical effect of 
the actual system, DJADJADJA RHV ˆˆˆˆ ++∆= , which supposedly represents the RE that would be 
achieved if HI were eliminated. However, in our example this is not true: the attainable RE is 
lowered because EPI induces reranking in the amount measured by CSDJAR ,ˆ . 
For 1=ν  there can be no reranking and 0ˆ , =CSDJAR . For 1>ν  it increases with ν , from a 
modest 0.3% of )(ˆ xiXI  for 4.1=ν  and 5.0=ε , to 1.4% of )(ˆ
x
iXI  for 3=ν  and 0=ε , when 
the share of CSDJAR ,ˆ  in HI of the actual system reaches 11.4%. 
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FIGURE 5 
COMPOSITION OF VERTICAL EFFECT 
(a) 1=ν       (b) 4.1=ν  
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(c) 2=ν       (d) 3=ν  
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Abbreviations: “Rc/IX” = )(ˆ/ˆ , xi
CSDJA XIR ; “(HIa-Rc)/IX” = )(ˆ/]ˆˆˆ[ , xi
CSDJADJADJA XIRRH −+ ; 
“REa/IX” = )(ˆ/ˆ xiXI∆  
3.6. Redistributive potential of the fiscal system 
Look at the amounts of potential RE; for some value ν , they always increase in ε ; when 1>ν , 
it seems that this increase in ε  is faster the lower the parameter ν . More importantly, notice that 
for some combinations of parameters, potential RE (and actual RE, too) is quite high for the 
Croatian system of personal taxes, public pensions and cash social benefits. For example, when 
5.1=ν  and 4.0=ε ,9 the actual RE reduces the pre-fiscal inequality by no less than 57.6%. The 
potential reduction is 65.6% if we take into account the reranking effect caused by CF, which is 
equal to 0.3% of )(ˆ xiXI . 
                                                   
9
 The combination of parameters preferred by DJA (2003). 
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4. Conclusion 
The models decomposing redistributive effect into vertical, classical horizontal inequity and 
reranking effects are highly demanded by practitioners around the world. The Duclos, Jalbert and 
Araar (2003) decomposition has the prospect to become a leading tool in this area. However, this 
outlook is possibly jeopardized by difficulties that usually occur during the implementation of 
the model on the real data. Urban (2010) offers recipes for one of the major problems – the 
estimation of the expected post-fiscal income curve.  
This paper is a follow-up to the said study, dealing with further challenges a researcher 
may be faced with. More specifically, when there is a large number of pre-fiscal income equals 
in the sample, the common methods of index computation may produce a misleading estimate of 
the relative importance of CHI and the reranking effect, and can mistakenly convince the analyst 
that the estimate of EPI is wrong. 
A step-by-step guide for an appropriate application of the DJA model is delivered. The 
procedure starts with basic data manipulations, continues with the calculation of different income 
and utility vectors and indices, and ends with the analysis and interpretation of results. The 
procedure is first employed on a 12-units hypothetical population and then on real data for the 
Croatian fiscal subsystem comprising social security contributions, personal income tax, public 
pensions and cash social benefits. 
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